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ACT III OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
Paul Horwitz*
INTRODUCTION
Law is filled with stories without endings. Case reports and law
review articles generally conclude with the judgment on a case. Once
judgment is rendered, either by a judge or by a scholar analyzing an
opinion, it is unusual for anyone to consider what happens next.1 In drama,
a gun that appears onstage in Act I is sure to go off in Act III: the play has
not ended until there is a climax; until the full narrative has reached its
conclusion.2 In law, the curtain often draws shut abruptly at the end of Act
II.
One obvious reason for this is that the law and its students generally
focus on a single question: the question of legal power—especially the
power of courts to order some action and make it stick.3 Authority,
jurisdiction, liability or immunity; terms like these are the meat and drink of
the law—the keys that unlock the answer to the question of who gets to
―say what the law is.‖4
It is all perfectly natural, and perfectly odd. Consider some famous
cases that turn on the question of the nature and limits of judicial power. It
is natural to want to know, in a case in which a police department has been
using a potentially lethal ―chokehold‖ method of restraint, whether the
department can be made to cease its conduct.5 If the government is accused
of bombing a country with which it is not at war, you naturally want to
know whether it can be ordered to ground its planes.6 If a private company
is collaborating with a state to engage in the extraordinary rendition of
individuals to nations that commit torture, you want to know whether the
company can be held to account, or whether any litigation should be
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Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. I am grateful to the participants
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1
As always, there are exceptions. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional
Secrecy and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63 (1998).
2
See ACADEMIC DICTIONARY OF FICTION 40 (Ashish Pandey ed., 2005) (citing Anton Chekhov).
3
See, e.g., Christoph Menke, Law and Violence, 22 LAW & LIT. 1, 11 (2010) (―Law is about power,
its own power.‖). The canonical discussion is Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J.
1601 (1986).
4
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (link).
5
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (link).
6
See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (link).
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dismissed because it would require the revelation of sensitive confidential
information.7
Unless your focus is narrow and your curiosity highly limited,
however, you will also want to know what happens next. Unless you
confuse the ―is‖ of judicial or governmental power with a moral ―ought,‖
you are unlikely to think that the fact that a party, public or private, can do
something without legal consequences means that it should. Some party
will be left with the final authority to act. However, how it acts matters as
much or more than the fact that it can act. To say that a dispute is out of the
court‘s hands does not mean it is in no one‘s hands at all. The party with
the authority will still have a choice about what to do with that authority.
And when, in one of these judicial dramas, the court‘s obligations end, our
obligations as citizens are just beginning. We must decide whether to bow
out of the tale, leaving the party with the authority to act as it wishes, or
whether we should take soft or hard action to persuade it to act as we think
it should. Legal power is not always the last word.
In its 2011 October Term, the Supreme Court will decide whether to
uphold the ―ministerial exception‖ in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & School v. EEOC.8 This judicial doctrine, rooted in the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, provides that churches are entitled to legal
immunity from employment discrimination claims brought by employees
acting in a ―ministerial‖ position.9
If experience is any guide, the discussion on both sides of this question
will focus on Act II. It will focus on power, jurisdiction, and immunity. At
the extremes, it will involve arguments over whether the Religion Clauses
require complete immunity from suit in ministerial discrimination cases or
whether they require churches to be treated the same as any other
employer.10 And in many respects, there will be a tendency, more or less
7

See, e.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) (link); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,
614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (link).
8
131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (link). For the oral arguments, held on October 5, 2011, see Transcript of
Oral Argument, Hosanna-Tabor, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (No. 10533), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-553.pdf (link).
9
See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 2006) (link);
Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350–51 (5th
Cir. 1999) (link); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461–62 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (link);
Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168–69 (4th Cir. 1985) (link);
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (link). As one court put it, the basic rule
suggests that one or both of the Religion Clauses ―deprive[] a federal court of jurisdiction to hear a Title
VII employment discrimination suit brought against a church by a member of its clergy, even when the
church‘s challenged actions are not based on religious doctrine.‖ Combs, 173 F.3d at 345.
10
There are intermediate positions, of course. One could argue that the Religion Clauses do not
require the ministerial exception but that legislatures are free to enact such exceptions. Or one could
concede that the ministerial exception exists as a matter of constitutional law but argue over the
occasions for its application. It is possible to take an intermediate position like this without confusing
―is‖ and ―ought,‖ although some people will do so even then.
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overt, to treat the answer to the power question as dispositive of the
question of whether churches ought to invoke the ministerial exception
whenever they wish.
In this Essay, I argue that we are wrong to treat Hosanna-Tabor and
the ministerial exception doctrine as ending with Act II. Rather, in thinking
about the doctrine, we—especially those of us who have championed the
ministerial exception11—have a scholarly and moral obligation to think
about what happens next, assuming that the Supreme Court reaffirms the
doctrine and its constitutionality. We need to do so from a perspective that
acknowledges the dangers as well as the value of church autonomy. This
perspective treats churches as imperfect institutions, not saintly ones, and
asks what sorts of nonlegal levers—from internal debates within churches
to external public criticism—might encourage churches to exercise their
authority sensitively and appropriately. Conversely, opponents of the
ministerial exception doctrine ought to cease caricaturizing churches as
self-interested institutions whose only apparent goal is to escape legal
liability for egregious employment practices. These critics should think
instead about the role that nonlegal mechanisms can play in encouraging
fairness to employees.
I begin by offering a defense of the ministerial exception doctrine.
Because other writers in this colloquy focus on that question, I will keep my
own contributions relatively brief.12 I then discuss the role of both internal
religious discussion and external public criticism as tools for policing the
use of the ministerial exception. I argue that ―Act III‖ thinking is necessary
not only to properly evaluate the law in this area, but also because scholars
and citizens have a moral obligation to think about what autonomous
institutions like churches ought to do, not just about how the law allocates
authority in this area.
I. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AS POWER
The basic defense of the ministerial exception starts with history and
first principles. The historical argument is ultimately a recapitulation of
Western legal and political history itself. As Michael McConnell puts it:
[F]rom at least the time of Pope Gelasius [in the fifth
century A.D.], standard legal thinking in Western Europe
was based on the theory of Two Kingdoms—the idea that
God created two different forms of authority, two swords
that were clearly distinguished: spiritual and temporal,

11
See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (forthcoming 2012) (on file with
author); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009) (link).
12
For a more extensive presentation of my views, see the works cited supra note 11.
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sacred and secular, church and state. These spheres were
undeniably separate, and not because the state chose to
make them so.13
That general concept endured even after the schism in Western
Christianity caused by the Reformation. Lutheran thought, for instance, did
away with the concept of ―two swords,‖ but replaced it with one of ―two
kingdoms.‖14 Despite their differences, a common theme ran through these
formulations: ―the spiritual and temporal powers‖ must ―remain separate in
function,‖ and at a minimum, the temporal authority has ―no power
to . . . mete out religious discipline.‖15
The American tradition of separation, revolutionary as it seemed, is
basically continuous with this history. As one of the amici curiae in the
Hosanna-Tabor case observes, ―This differentiation between the
institutions of church and state has become a part of the American
constitutional tradition.‖16 Indeed, the tradition predates the Constitution
itself. It can be found in the writings of Roger Williams,17 the structure of
the Puritan communities in New England, and elsewhere.18 The preamble
to the Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts Bay in 1648, for example,
proclaimed: ―[O]ur churches and civil state have been planted, and grown
up (like two twins),‖ and to conflate the two would lead to the ―misery (if
not ruin) of both.‖19 Closer to the Revolutionary Era, it was apparent in the
thinking of John Adams, who admired the vision of separate spheres
championed by the Puritans and made sure that the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 guaranteed the right of churches to select their own
ministers without state interference.20 It was also evident in the ―strikingly
13

Michael W. McConnell, Non-State Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 7, 8 (link). For similar
sentiments, see, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1869 (2009) (book review) (link); John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation,
101 MICH. L. REV. 1869 (2003) (book review).
14
See, e.g., William B. Ewald, The Protestant Revolutions and Western Law, 22 CONST. COMMENT.
181, 188 (2005) (reviewing HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2003)).
15
Witte, supra note 13, at 1878–79.
16
Brief Amici Curiae of Professor Eugene Volokh et al. in Support of Petitioner at 6, HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No. 10-533), 2011 WL
2470847, at *6 [hereinafter Volokh Brief].
17
See, e.g., Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams on Liberty of Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 289, 290–91 (2005).
18
See Horwitz, supra note 11, at 100–04. For other examples, see Volokh Brief, supra note 16, at
12–18.
19
LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY A2 (1648) (Max Farrand ed., 1929).
20
See JOHN WITTE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EARLY MODERN CALVINISM 309–11 (2007); see also Joshua D. Dunlap, Note, When Big Brother Plays
God: The Religion Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005,
2016 (2007) (quoting the relevant passage of Massachusetts‘s constitution).
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jurisdictional‖ language that James Madison employed in his influential
Memorial and Remonstrance: ―[I]n matters of Religion, no man‘s right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and . . . Religion is wholly
exempt from its cognizance.‖21 In the post-revolutionary period, ―[t]he key
to resolving‖ church versus state disputes ―was to define a private sphere,
protected against interference by the vested rights doctrine and the
separation of church and state.‖22 The American tradition, in short, has long
embraced ―a constitutional order in which the institutions of religion . . . are
distinct from, other than, and meaningfully independent of, the institutions
of government.‖23
Some central constitutional principles rest on this historical foundation.
The most important is the oft-repeated notion that religious institutions in
this nation must have the ―power to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine.‖24 Similarly, the state may not interfere with a church‘s selection
or rejection of its religious members, let alone its leaders.25
A third principle regularly derived both from this history and from
broader views about the judicial role in church-state cases is that judges
cannot evaluate the kinds of religious questions that come up in
employment discrimination cases involving ministerial employees, among
other places. This position is sometimes called the ―hands off‖ rule.26 One
standard argument for this rule is that judges are simply incompetent to
address religious questions. For strategic reasons, opponents of the
ministerial exception focus substantially on judicial incompetence. It
allows them to argue that many ministerial exception cases raise issues that
21
Smith, supra note 13, at 1880 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting JAMES
MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE 59, 60 (J.F. Maclear ed., 1995)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
22
Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court’s Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on
Religious-Cultural-Political Conflict in the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REV. 7, 42 (2001).
23
Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22
ST. JOHN‘S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 523 (2007).
24
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116
(1952) (link).
25
See, e.g., id. at 119 (observing that free exercise of religion entails freedom of ―an ecclesiastical
right, the Church‘s choice of its hierarchy‖); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280
U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (―[I]t is the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential
qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them.‖) (link); Bouldin v.
Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 139–40 (1872) (recognizing that courts ―cannot decide who ought to
be members of the church‖) (link); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558–59 (5th Cir. 1972)
(―The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. . . . Matters touching
this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern[]‖ and lie ―beyond the
purview of civil authorities.‖).
26
See generally Samuel J. Levine, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Religious
Doctrine: An Introduction, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 793 (2009) (discussing the Supreme Court‘s
―hands-off approach‖) (link).
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judges are competent to decide,27 and that courts engaged in case-by-case
analyses of such disputes end up entangled in even more theological
questions.28
So the conventional justifications for the ministerial exception consist
of a set of simple principles that, its supporters contend, have a long
historical pedigree. Courts cannot decide religious disputes. Thus, they
may not resolve questions of church doctrine or governance. And they may
not interfere in a church‘s decision about who constitutes an acceptable
leader or member. These principles focus on the fundamentals of religious
freedom—those rights without which basic religious freedom could not be
said to exist—and on the incapacities of courts. For many supporters of the
ministerial exception, however, they are still just surface matters,
conclusions that follow from deeper premises. They lead us back to the
central question that occupies the law, at least up through Act II: the
question of power.
Here, some of us see a fundamental and perhaps more radical principle
underlying not only the ministerial exception, but the law of religious
freedom generally: courts, and the state itself, are simply not authorized to
intervene in life at the heart of churches. At a deep level, these questions lie
beyond the reach of the state altogether. The two kingdoms of temporal
and spiritual authority, of church and state, constitute two separate
sovereigns. The state can no more intervene in the sovereign affairs of
churches than it can in the sovereign affairs of Mexico or Canada. This
allocation of authority is not intended to signal the primacy of churches or
the inferiority of the state. It is a double-sided settlement as ancient as
Western political culture itself, one that says that ―government is not the
sole possessor of sovereignty‖ and that churches ―exercise within the area
of [their] competence an authority so effective as to justify labeling it a
sovereign authority‖ all their own.29 Whatever a church‘s ―area[s] of
competence‖ may be, it extends at least to fundamental questions of church
structure and leadership, and thus removes the state from control over
ministerial employment decisions like those in Hosanna-Tabor. As radical
as this description may seem, it lies at the heart of the Western church-state
settlement. It is reflected in the many decisions in which courts have said

27

See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law and Religion Professors in Support of Respondents at 26,
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No. 10-533),
2011 WL 3532698, at *26 (―Hosanna-Tabor incorrectly assumes that adjudicating ministers‘
antidiscrimination claims will require courts to decide questions beyond their institutional competence.
A court may decide [a plaintiff‘s] retaliation claim without ever becoming entangled in doctrinal or
theological questions.‖) [hereinafter Professors‘ Brief].
28
See id. at 32–35.
29
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV.
91, 91 (1953).
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that the ministerial exception is not merely an affirmative defense but a
jurisdictional matter.30
The power-based argument for the ministerial exception is not novel.
But it is radical, or at least it may seem so to those who have grown
accustomed to thinking that the state is the ultimate arbiter. Its opponents
have room to argue that it runs contrary to the statist orientation of modern
law, exemplified by the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Employment Division
v. Smith, which said that the Free Exercise Clause could not stand in the
way of any neutral and generally applicable law that only incidentally
burdens religion.31
But even the relatively statist modern Supreme Court has recognized
that there are realms the law is not free to enter. If the greatest weakness of
the proponents of the ministerial exception is the sweeping nature of their
claims, its opponents‘ greatest weakness is that they ignore the fact that the
Court has never pushed too hard on the rule of general applicability and
other imperial claims on the part of the state. It has always pulled back,
recognizing limits to the state‘s reach where central internal religious
practices are involved. Smith itself is an example. Citing its long history of
deference and abstention in cases involving church property and
employment, the Court reaffirmed the central Free Exercise principle that
government must not ―lend its power to one or the other side in
controversies over religious authority or dogma.‖32 Even after Smith, core
areas of church doctrine and governance remain untouched by the state.33
30
See, e.g., EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 775 (6th
Cir. 2010) (link); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007) (link); Tomic
v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006); see generally Gregory A. Kalscheur,
S.J., Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, SubjectMatter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43 (2008) (exploring
the jurisdictional aspects of the ministerial exception) (link). For a broader historical argument to this
effect, see Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent & Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early
American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385; see also Volokh Brief, supra note 16, at 4 (―The civil
authority lacks ‗competence‘ to intervene in such matters, not so much because they lie beyond its
technical or intellectual capacity, but because they lie beyond its jurisdictional power.‖).
31
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (link).
32
Id. at 877.
33
See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 3919718, at *6 (noting that ―Smith preserved a
longstanding distinction between internal church governance, including selection of ministers, and
conscientious objection to general regulation,‖ only the latter of which is subject to Smith‘s rule of
neutrality, and arguing that this distinction has been around since at least the time of John Locke)
[hereinafter Reply Brief].
Besides Smith, the other case emphasized by opponents of the ministerial exception is Jones v. Wolf,
in which the Supreme Court held that states may (but need not) resolve church property disputes by
giving legal recognition to the non-religious language of church constitutions, property deeds, state
statutes, and other relevant legal documents, just as they would in other property disputes. 443 U.S. 595
(1979) (link). Because Jones allows courts to use the ―neutral principles‖ approach rather than requiring
deference to churches in all cases, some critics argue that it ―seriously undercuts any argument that [the
Court‘s prior] cases guarantee a broad right of church autonomy.‖ Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the
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In short, if the advocates of the ministerial exception can be criticized
for thinking too big, emphasizing church autonomy in a general way while
neglecting important practical and doctrinal details, its opponents can be
criticized for overreading (and sometimes misreading) the doctrine and
neglecting the fundamental principles that lie behind it. The ministerial
exception is not some incidental, ad hoc creation. It is a fundamental part
of the structure of American religious freedom; a recognition of the basic
idea that the First Amendment, the Constitution, and Western
constitutionalism more generally guarantee a ―free Church in a free State.‖34
It ensures, at a minimum, that absent extraordinary circumstances, churches
must have a free hand in selecting those who perform basic religious
functions.35 One need not accept the widest possible account of church
autonomy in order to agree on that much.36 As a legal matter, then, I
Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption From Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1965, 1987 (2007) (link). They read the phrase ―neutral principles‖ in Jones together with the
―neutral and generally applicable law‖ language of Smith to suggest a general rejection of church
autonomy. On this view, Jones stands for the proposition that courts should ―[a]pply employment
discrimination law to a religious employer in the same way it would be applied to a secular employer.‖
Professors‘ Brief, supra note 27, at 36.
As I have written elsewhere, however, Jones ―was, in short, an effort to accommodate church
autonomy, not to eliminate it.‖ Horwitz, supra note 11, at 118 (emphasis omitted); see also Perry Dane,
“Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1743–44 (arguing that the neutral principles approach
makes sense only ―in the context of an effort to effectuate a religious community‘s effort to specify the
form that the community‘s autonomy should take through some type of private ordering‖) (link). Its
point was to allow churches to use legal language in deeds, trusts, and other documents to insulate
themselves from judicial interference. In any event, even Jones says explicitly that the ―neutral
principles‖ approach only applies where a court can interpret a legal document relating to church
property disputes without deciding questions of ―religious doctrine or polity.‖ Jones, 443 U.S. at 602.
34
ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 78, 99 (photo. reprint 2007) (1898). Cf. EEOC v.
Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that the lower courts‘ ministerial
exception decisions ―rely on a long line of Supreme Court cases that affirm the fundamental right of
churches to ‗decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as
those of faith and doctrine.‘‖ (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952))) (link).
35
See, e.g., Reply Brief, supra note 33, at 10 (Hosanna-Tabor ―is about institutional separation—
the least controversial core of separation of church and state‖); id. (―The government cannot control the
internal affairs of churches any more than churches can control the institutions of government.‖).
36
See, e.g., Volokh Brief, supra note 16, at 32 (conceding that not everyone counts as a ―minister‖
for purposes of the ministerial exception); id. at 39 (noting that ―there are difficult questions to be asked
and fine lines to be drawn‖ in the doctrine). That said, one advantage of an emphasis on the ministerial
exception as an example of the limits of state power is that it reduces or eliminates some of the hangover
questions that its opponents argue will persist as long as it is narrowly applied. For example, it has been
argued that as long as courts decide who counts as a minister on a case-by-case basis, they will end up
far more entangled with religion than they would be if the ministerial exception were simply done away
with. See, e.g., Professors‘ Brief, supra note 27, at 32–35. Those entanglement questions will largely
disappear if, as they should, courts, recognizing the limits of their authority in this realm, defer
substantially to the churches‘ own determinations that an employee is a minister. See Reply Brief, supra
note 33, at 22 (arguing that a broad ministerial exception rule ―is far less entangling than respondents‘
invitation to probe deeply into every case‖).
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believe the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor should affirm the existence
and constitutional status of the ministerial exception.
II. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AS RESPONSIBILITY
At first glance, the question of whether the ministerial exception exists
may seem to be the only, or at least the most important, question raised by
Hosanna-Tabor. It is neither. Just as we ought to care whether the United
States actually bombs Cambodia and not just that the court says it will not
interfere with such a decision, we likewise ought to care about what
churches actually do with the ministerial exception, not just that it exists.
We ought to care, in other words, about what actually happens on the
ground in Act III when we move beyond the basic Act I or II question of
power and think about what churches do with that power.
Thus, suppose that the Supreme Court either affirms the constitutional
status of the ministerial exception or, alternatively, holds that it is not
required, but permits Congress and the state legislatures to enact such an
exception. Suppose also that the scope of the ministerial exception,
whether constitutional or statutory, is broad: churches are given substantial
deference in declaring a church employee to be a ―minister‖ who falls under
the exception and the exception applies to a variety of actions, including the
retaliation action brought by Cheryl Perich in the Hosanna-Tabor case.
What then? What should churches do with their victory? Should citizens
consider their own role in the conversation to be over?
Surely a church‘s deliberations as to when to invoke the exception and
how to treat complaints will not end once the ministerial exception is firmly
in place. While courts must defer to the church‘s decision, deference does
not tell us what the church should do.37 The answer to that question will
vary, just as churches vary. Assume for a moment that the ministerial
exception is somewhat limited in scope, applying only to cases where a
It is also worth acknowledging a broader argument made by the opponents of the ministerial
exception: despite the occasional use of the language of church autonomy, courts frequently subject
churches to various legal regimes, which they could not do if churches were truly autonomous. See,
e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v.
EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 96, 105 n.60 (2011) (link). A strong view of church autonomy
does raise questions about those cases. Again, however, all that is at issue in a case like Hosanna-Tabor
is that, at a minimum, churches must be able to select and dismiss ministerial employees without fear of
legal intrusion. See, e.g., Reply Brief, supra note 33, at 10 (arguing that the rule that ―government
cannot control the internal affairs of churches,‖ including key employment decisions involving
ministerial employees, is part of the ―least controversial core of separation of church and state‖). To
argue against the doctrine altogether because it has some limits is no more sensible than it would be to
argue that because employers can sometimes raise bona fide occupational qualifications as a defense in
employment discrimination actions, we should simply do away with employment discrimination law.
37
See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1072–73 (2008)
(defining deference as ―a decisionmaker following a determination made by some other individual or
institution that it might not otherwise have reached had it decided the same question independently‖)
(link).
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church asserts that some employment action involves a direct conflict with
religious doctrine.38 Then the interaction between that church‘s doctrine
and a forbidden employment action becomes legally relevant. It might well
matter to the church for nonlegal reasons too. A church that strongly
opposes racial discrimination, as virtually all of them do,39 might welcome
the availability of legal remedies in that situation for a variety of reasons: a
belief that the church should generally obey the law, a belief that racial
discrimination is wrong and deserves a legal remedy, and so on.
However, what if the ministerial exception is treated as genuinely
jurisdictional in nature, leaving plaintiffs with no legal remedy in
antidiscrimination cases involving ministerial employees? A church would
still have a number of options, and its choices would still vary, depending
on a mix of factors. A church that opposes discrimination might still want
to provide ministers who complain of discrimination with an internal
dispute resolution process and a set of remedies equivalent to those
provided by the law. It might conclude that nothing less would satisfy its
own religious belief that discrimination is wrong, and that the church owes
it to victims of discrimination (and to God) to make them whole. Or it
might provide meaningful alternative remedies due to a fear on the part of
church leadership that a failure to take such claims seriously would lead to
dissent and a loss of confidence in the leadership. In either case, the point
is clear: the ministerial exception is not the same thing as indifference to the
goals of civil rights laws, nor does it mean that particular churches would
inevitably seek total immunity. Reasons of deep religious conscience, as
well as practical concerns about the reaction of members, might lead a
church to give claimants substantial rights, even in the absence of any
judicial process.40

38

See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 448 F.3d 615, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 13135, at *2 (3d Cir.
2006) (holding that a church must argue that discrimination is required by one of its religious tenets
before the ministerial exception can apply), vacated, 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006); Elvig v. Calvin
Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing sexual harassment claim to proceed
against church where it did not offer a religious reason for its conduct) (link). The Gannon opinion was
vacated and replaced by a broader decision holding that the ministerial exception applies even where the
basis for the employment action is non-religious. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303–04
(3d Cir. 2006) (link).
39
See, e.g., THE BOOK OF DISCIPLINE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH ¶ 430 (2008), available
at http://www.nyac.com/pages/detail/1755 (―[A]ppointments are made without regard to race, ethnic
origin, gender, color, disability, marital status, or age, except for the provisions of mandatory
retirement.‖) (link). For these and other citations to specific provisions of church discipline, I am
indebted to Chris Lund for his recent article defending the ministerial exception. See Christopher C.
Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 101 (2011) (link).
40
It should also be noted that even under this strong jurisdictional reading of the ministerial
exception, not all disputes involving ministers would necessarily be outside the jurisdiction of the courts.
As the church notes in its reply brief in Hosanna-Tabor:

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/27/

165

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

Another question is how churches should treat the claimants in such
cases. The fact that the judicial process would be unavailable does not
mean churches would lack any interest, religious or otherwise, in providing
due process to claimants. Indeed, some churches provide strong procedural
protections for ministers dismissed under these circumstances—protections
that predate the judicial recognition of the ministerial exception.41 Consider
the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, whose conduct is at issue in
Hosanna-Tabor. Although the church considers itself the sole arbiter of
employment disputes involving its ministers,42 its dispute resolution
procedures are no charade. They include a basic trial process, limited
discovery, the right to counsel, and an appeal process. They also establish
neutral tribunals whose members are maintained by the Synod itself, not the
local congregation.43 The church‘s substantive standards are also real.
Indeed, the Synod‘s laws might ultimately have vindicated Perich‘s
complaint.44 As one amicus group of experts on religious tribunals
observes, although ―[r]eligious court systems can be quite varied,‖ many
―share certain primary characteristics, including discernible substantive
standards and procedural rights,‖ as well as ―a stated commitment to evenhandedness‖ and an effort to ―ensure that the religious organization is not
unfairly favored in the crafting and execution of the process.‖45
When a church signs a contract written in secular language, the contract can be
enforced unless the basic dispute is entangled in religious questions. So, for
example, a contract claim challenging discharge for cause generally cannot
proceed, but a contract claim for unpaid salary or benefits generally can. Such
secular contract claims have always co-existed with the ministerial exception.
Reply Brief, supra note 33, at 9. This is further evidence that the ministerial exception‘s opponents
misread Jones v. Wolf. See supra note 33. Jones does not mean churches are never entitled to
autonomy. Instead, by allowing churches to draft employment contracts with ministers that are at least
partly enforceable in court, it allows churches to voluntarily limit the scope of their autonomy, leaving
room for some legally enforceable employment claims by ministers where, for various reasons, churches
wish to expose aspects of their relationships with ministers to the jurisdiction of the civil courts. See
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
41
See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs
(―COLPA‖) Filed on Behalf of the Orthodox Jewish Organizations and Rabbinical Courts in Support of
Petitioner at 7–8, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011)
(No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470841, at *7–8 (discussing the history of rabbinic courts) [hereinafter
COLPA Brief].
42
See HANDBOOK OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH: MISSOURI SYNOD § 1.10.2 (2004), available at
www.lcms.org/Document.fdoc?src=lcm&id=926 (link).
43
See Lund, supra note 39, at 142–43; see also Steven R. Hadley, Handbook of American Church
Courts, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 251, 263 (2000) (citing the Seventh-Day Adventists as one example of a
church whose dispute resolution procedures call for ―neutral, impartial, and independent‖ adjudicators).
44
See Lund, supra note 39, at 143 (noting that ―the Synod‘s church courts would only approve of
Perich‘s call being terminated in rare and specifically delineated circumstances‖).
45
Brief of Religious Tribunal Experts Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6–7, HosannaTabor, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 2470843, at *6–7 [hereinafter Religious Tribunal
Experts‘ Brief].
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In short, it would be wrong to end one‘s inquiry at Act II and assume
that the ministerial exception leaves claimants with no recourse whatsoever.
Unsurprisingly, given the long history of church jurisdiction over internal
religious matters, churches themselves regularly provide meaningful
procedural and substantive justice in disputes with their members or
leaders.46
Three additional issues need to be considered in our examination of
Act III of the ministerial exception. First, some churches believe as a
matter of religious doctrine that churches themselves ought to decide
disputes with their ministers, even when they share the basic goals of the
civil rights laws.47 They believe that disputes within the church should be
resolved informally and not antagonistically, that internal dispute resolution
is part of the shepherding function of the church and should be undertaken
with compassion and care, that litigating such cases in the civil courts is a
public scandal or causes irreparable harm to the relationship between
church and minister, and so on.48
Second, some churches hold complex views about the effect of an
internal dispute on the relationship between the minister and the church.
From a secular perspective, we may view the assertion of one‘s legal rights
as a common, even laudable, phenomenon. From a communal and religious
perspective, however, such conduct may violate both church doctrine
favoring the internal resolution of disputes and the spirit of community and
peacefulness that guides the church.49

46
See, e.g., COLPA Brief, supra note 41, at 10 (citing a judgment in an employment dispute
decided by a beth din, or rabbinic court, that ―substantially exceeded any judgment the employee could
have obtained in a New York court‖); Religious Tribunal Experts‘ Brief, supra note 45, at 8 (noting that
the Judicial Council of the United Methodist Church ―has issued over 1,100 decisions addressing diverse
ecclesiastical issues within the UMC, including ministerial employment matters‖); id. at 8 n.9 (citing a
decision of that tribunal in which it ordered the reinstatement of a clergy member, along with the
payment of ―retroactive benefits and compensation,‖ after finding a violation of due process in the prior
proceeding); id. at 19 n.55 (citing cases in which beth din courts found in favor of rabbis in employment
disputes with synagogues); see generally Hadley, supra note 43 (discussing cases).
47
As Chris Lund explains:

Even when churches agree with the principle of non-discrimination laws, they
[may] still have quite understandable reasons to object to the government
investigating, adjudicating, and remedying what the government decides are
discriminatory acts. There is all the difference in the world between a church
pursuing its own values and the state enforcing those values back on the church.
Lund, supra note 39, at 141–42.
48
These and other arguments can be found in Hadley, supra note 43.
49
See, e.g., Brief for International Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention et al. at 22–
23, Hosanna-Tabor, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470840, at *22–23 (―In essence, the
Church concluded that Perich‘s conduct [pressing her claims through the threat of litigation] impeded,
and that she was not sufficiently committed to, the Church‘s religious mission.‖).
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Third, even if a church takes neither of these positions, and even if it
strongly opposes discrimination, it may have a different view of what
constitutes ―discrimination.‖50 It is surely unsurprising that churches may
champion the view that all are equal in God‘s eye, but take a different view
than the law does about what constitutes equal status—concluding, for
example, that women are equally beloved by God, but occupy a role in the
church that does not involve the call to ministry.
Churches need not hold any of these views, but they may hold some or
all of them. That matters for both Act II and Act III reasons. First, it
suggests that there are problems with the argument that the ministerial
exception should not apply to retaliation suits. Unlike a decision to fire an
employee on religious grounds, the argument goes, a church‘s decision to
fire an employee in retaliation for the exercise of her legal rights does not
involve entanglement with religious doctrine; the court can accept that the
church had religious reasons for retaliation but still conclude that churches
are not exempt from antiretaliation laws.51 As we have seen, however,
churches hold complex views with respect to the nature of their relationship
with ministers and with the civil courts. A plaintiff‘s decision to bring a
retaliation action in a civil court, and not a religious one, can thus raise
theological questions of a high order. My own view is that the ministerial
exception has more to do with the limits of state power than with questions
of entanglement.
Regardless, there is little doubt that allowing
antiretaliation suits to proceed raises serious entanglement concerns.52

50

See Lund, supra note 39, at 145 (―[M]ost churches see themselves as fully committed to racial
justice, to gender equality, to treating the disabled with dignity, and to protecting the elderly. But there
is no reason to think that the church‘s conception of any of these things matches the state‘s
conception.‖). Churches can also take a view of ―discrimination‖ that is broader than its legal
definition. See id. at 146 (noting that some churches‘ aggressive efforts to increase the number of
women in the ministry could violate current antidiscrimination law).
51
See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Respondent at 37, Hosanna-Tabor, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (No. 10-553),
2011 WL 3319555, at *37. There is an interesting inconsistency here. Critics of the ministerial
exception insist that the best way to avoid entanglement in retaliation cases is not to accept the courts‘
assertions of religious grounds on a blanket basis but to dismiss them as irrelevant under the rule in
Smith. Elsewhere, however, they argue that courts must not accept at face value a church‘s assertion
that a particular employee is a minister but must instead engage in a careful consideration of the
employee‘s ministerial status. They then argue that this case-by-case approach would entangle the court
in theological questions, and that the ministerial exception should therefore be abandoned. See, e.g.,
Professors‘ Brief, supra note 27, at 32–35. These critics, in short, argue for deference to the church‘s
determinations in some cases and against deference in others; in both instances, their arguments
ultimately favor the employee. See also Reply Brief, supra note 33, at 19 (noting a similar
inconsistency between the Hosanna-Tabor respondents‘ petition for certiorari and their merits brief:
they initially complained that the ministerial exception is illegitimate because it ―require[s] a factintensive inquiry,‖ and now complain that the ministerial exception ―is an overly ‗broad‘, ‗categorical‘,
and ‗prophylactic immunity‘, inconsistent with case-by-case resolution of constitutional questions.‖).
52
See Reply Brief, supra note 33, at 23–27 (arguing that the ministerial exception must apply to
antiretaliation claims).
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These issues are especially relevant within the Act III realm. There is
a rich diversity of potential responses by churches to claims of
discrimination on the part of a ministerial employee. In concrete terms,
they can offer anything from no process at all, to an informal and
communal process, to a detailed trial process with substantial guarantees of
fairness and impartiality. Just as important, though, are the less concrete
considerations. Churches can treat discrimination complaints as disruptions
or even insults to the church and its members. Or they can take the view
that the church has a religious duty to avoid discrimination, one that is
every bit as central to the church as any other religious tenet. They can treat
these complaints as isolated incidents or as matters that demand a broad
institutional response. They can react with defensiveness or they can seek
outreach, reconciliation, and growth. They can view the complainant as an
adversary and close ranks or they can try to approach that individual with
compassion, care, and a sense of community.
In sum, even if the ministerial exception continues to exist, a court‘s
dismissal of a case on those grounds will not signal the end of churches‘
responsibilities, but rather the beginning. Churches will still have many
decisions to make. Each one will reflect the church‘s deepest beliefs, its
highest goals, and sometimes, its worst failings. Indeed, most of the
important questions about the ministerial exception will not arise until Act
III.
III. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AND THE DUTY OF LAY AND PUBLIC
DISCUSSION
So far, I have argued that church leaders have a continuing obligation
to think carefully about the proper occasions for the ministerial exception
and about how to treat ministers‘ complaints. That obligation carries a
strong moral component. A church must consider its own religious duties,
including the obligation to treat complainants with love and compassion; it
must consider its obligations as an institution functioning at least partly in
the secular world.
But the ministerial exception, like most allocations of power, does not
just create duties for those who exercise it directly. As a reflection of the
church‘s role as a major infrastructural institution within society,53 the
ministerial exception and its proper use should concern all of us.
Monitoring its use, and sometimes criticizing it, is a civic duty as well as a
religious one.

53

See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 11 (manuscript at 224); Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches
Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 274
(2008) (link); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 39–40 (2002).
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There is room here for both internal criticism and external public
criticism.54 Even within rigidly hierarchical institutions, there is a great deal
of room for internal discussion, dissent, and reform. All institutions have
many constituencies, any one of which can influence the institution‘s
beliefs and actions. Even where a church‘s doctrine is set solely by its
leaders, those leaders must still consider the potential effects of their actions
on their members and the risk that those members will abandon the church.
The leadership may conclude that some doctrine is so important that it must
be preserved even at the cost of losing members, but it will certainly be
aware of that potential cost. In less hierarchical religious institutions, it is
even clearer that a church‘s treatment of its ministers is a communal matter
that involves the whole church.
These kinds of questions involve both specific religious norms and
general civic norms. In each dispute with a ministerial employee, the
church and its members will have to consider not only what their religious
tenets demand, but whether they have any general moral obligations to that
employee and any general civic obligations to respect the social norms of
nondiscrimination and conformity to the law.
These questions should also be aired outside the church itself. Citizens
are not only permitted, but positively obliged to monitor and criticize our
central social institutions, whether they belong to them or not. They are
responsible for the civic order as a whole, including the institutions that
form the bedrock of that civic order.
This duty is obvious when we are talking about the state, but it is just
as true for private infrastructural institutions. Whether the New York Times
publishes the Pentagon Papers or shares materials from the Wikileaks
archives is a decision to be made in the first instance by that newspaper,
operating in accordance with professional and institutional norms, and not
the state.55 But that paper‘s readers, and citizens more generally, have the
duty to speak out if they believe that publication would threaten national
security—or, conversely, to urge journalists to be even more aggressive in
publishing information about important government actions that have been
kept secret. University professors make their own decisions about what to
teach and what research to conduct, and those decisions are insulated from
public interference. This autonomy rests on several justifications, one
being that academic freedom serves the public interest.56 But that autonomy
54

For discussions applying this point to a variety of ―First Amendment institutions,‖ see Horwitz,
supra note 11.
55
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (reversing an injunction
preventing the New York Times from publishing classified material) (link); see also Reply Brief, supra
note 33, at 26 (noting several areas of the law, all of them involving public or private institutions such as
the press, in which ―[legal] claims or remedies are barred because the resulting litigation would be too
problematic or too threatening to other constitutional values‖).
56
See, e.g., MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF
AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 44 (2009) (―Academic freedom is the price the public must pay in
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does not prohibit the public from monitoring and criticizing what
universities do. To the contrary, it is a civic duty to do so, even—or
perhaps especially—when the final authority rests with the institution itself.
These principles also apply to churches. If one believes that churches
are a fundamental part of our social infrastructure, and that this requires
some degree of church autonomy and some limits on state authority, then
surely one must believe that churches‘ decisions are as subject to public
commendation or criticism as the actions of any other major social
institution. Churches may not be answerable in a legal sense for actions
that lie at the heart of their institutional roles any more than newspapers are
legally accountable to the public for decisions of whether to publish
stories.57 But they are not immune from public criticism, and they are not
indifferent to it either. Like any other institution, they are susceptible to
moral suasion, reasoned argument, positive and negative reinforcement, and
public pressure. Citizens who care about our central social institutions can
and should provide exactly those sorts of pressures.
All this is worth emphasizing because I have no interest in painting a
rosy picture of churches or any other central social institution. Church
independence, like freedom of the press, academic autonomy, and other
institutionally-oriented constitutional freedoms, is grounded in a variety of
ideas: that the state is limited in its authority, that our social infrastructure
encompasses a variety of non-state institutions with their own spheres of
authority, that our constitutional settlement assumes these divisions of
authority, that courts are relatively incompetent to second-guess these
institutions‘ core decisions, and others.58 To subscribe to this structural
view of the importance of both state and non-state institutions in our social
and constitutional firmament, one need not believe that churches and other
institutions are perfect or that they will never abuse their autonomy.
Churches most certainly are not perfect and they will sometimes abuse their
autonomy. It is unfortunate, but unsurprising, that the briefs in support of
the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor say so much about churches‘ abuse of
authority, and the briefs in support of churches say so little about it.
Churches surely will fire ministers for good reasons, bad reasons, and
sometimes for no reason at all.
Supporters of the ministerial exception, and church autonomy more
broadly, must therefore avoid idealizing churches. They must acknowledge
return for the social good of advancing knowledge.‖); LOUIS MENAND, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS:
REFORM AND RESISTANCE IN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 130 (2010).
57
There are limits, of course, in both cases. Newspapers can be held accountable for libelous
statements, and churches can be liable for injuries to members or third parties, whether they involve
clergy sexual abuse or a church-owned van, driven by a minister, accidentally running over an old lady
in the street. See Reply Brief, supra note 33, at 20. But these peripheral limits do not say much about
institutional autonomy in core cases, like the hiring or firing of ministers.
58
These and other justifications are canvassed, and sometimes criticized, in my forthcoming book.
See HORWITZ, supra note 11.
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that all legal autonomy, even of a limited sort, carries risks of abuse. If we
are right about the deep nature of the constitutional settlement between
church and state, about the valuable role played by independent churches in
our constitutional and social infrastructure, and about the relative lack of
judicial and legislative competence and authority when it comes to core
church functions such as the selection of ministers, then the risk of abuse
should not shake us from our position. But a candid recognition of these
concerns may lead to a more realistic and productive conversation. It may
lead us to think more clearly about the role of internal and external
monitoring by church authorities, the laity, and citizens at large in
encouraging churches to wield their power prayerfully, compassionately,
and responsibly.
Conversely, recognizing the role of internal and external discussion
and criticism may encourage the critics of the ministerial exception to ease
up on their alarmist rhetoric. Some of the briefs in Hosanna-Tabor are
crammed with language suggesting that churches are barely leashed
monsters, waiting for a chance to run amok. They describe churches as
espousing ―a capacious theory of unaccountability,‖59 warn of a ―lawless
zone of defiance‖60 that would have ―devastating‖ consequences, and urge
the Court to reject any grant of ―a special privilege to religious
employers . . . that makes them a power unto themselves, separate and apart
from the democratic will of the community.‖61 That is impoverished Act II
thinking. It ignores the likelihood that most employment decisions made by
churches will be made in good faith, and it assumes quite wrongly that the
only effective check against abuse is a legal one. Public pressure and
institutional reconsideration, not judicial relief, led the Los Angeles Police
Department to abandon its chokehold policy and convinced the United
States to stop bombing Cambodia.62
In short, consequentialist arguments against the ministerial exception
will be wildly inaccurate unless they acknowledge the role of internal
discussion and public criticism in shaping the institutional norms, policies,
and actions of churches.63 We cannot properly assess the costs and benefits
59

Brief of Bishopaccountability.org et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 23,
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No. 10-533),
2011 WL 3532696, at *23.
60
Professors‘ Brief, supra note 27, at 2.
61
Brief of Amicus Curiae Neil H. Cogan in Support of Respondents Urging Affirmance at 4,
Hosanna-Tabor, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 3532697, at *4. I am not sure why it is more
ominous to think of churches, an important mediating institution, as being ―separate and apart from the
democratic will of the community‖ than it is to think of them as abject servants of the popular will,
subject to majority rule even with respect to core operations such as the selection of ministers.
62
See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
63
It should be clear, moreover, that many of the arguments against the ministerial exception are
consequentialist, and that the implications of those arguments are very broad. As I argued earlier, even
if the Supreme Court holds that the ministerial exception is not constitutionally required, it could still
allow legislatures to enact some form of exception. The briefs in Hosanna-Tabor are limited to the
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of the ministerial exception or church autonomy—or, indeed, any other
form of institutional autonomy—until we break out of a false dichotomy in
which one side is blind to anything except state power, and the other side
treats the church, the press, and other institutions as paragons of virtue. The
former approach pays too little attention to vast stretches of our
constitutional structure and culture and ignores the vital and often underexamined role of ―communities and movements‖ within our broader system
of constitutionalism.64 The latter approach will leave many difficult
questions unaddressed and will lack a full sense of moral accountability and
integrity, unless it acknowledges the costs of institutionalism. We must talk
candidly about potential abuses of the ministerial exception. But we must
do so in a way that accounts for all the ways of addressing those abuses,
including internal and public discussion within and about churches, not just
state coercion.
CONCLUSION
To be clear, I think the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor should
reaffirm the ministerial exception, treating it as a necessary implication of
both the historical church-state settlement and the basic principles of the
constitutional question, but at least one of them, along with some scholarship by critics of the exception,
suggests that any broad ministerial exception, including a statutory one, would be unconstitutional, bad
policy, or both. See, e.g., Professors‘ Brief, supra note 27, at 4–16, 30–31, 36 (offering consequentialist
arguments against the ministerial exception and arguing that the proper approach in light of these
consequences is to ―[a]pply employment discrimination law to a religious employer in the same way it
would be applied to a secular employer,‖ with the only apparent protection of any kind being a narrow
form of message-based associational freedom); Leslie C. Griffin, Smith and Women’s Equality,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1831, 1835 (2011) (criticizing legislatures for ―seek[ing] to undo Smith‘s regime
by exempting religious groups from the law‖) (link); id. at 1853 (―There is no good constitutional or
policy reason to allow religious organizations to retaliate against their workers‖). In fairness, some of
these critics concede that some form of exception might be constitutionally required or permissible as a
legislative matter. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 33, at 2038 (suggesting that churches could still invoke
a relatively narrow form of associational freedom in some cases); Leslie C. Griffin, No Law Respecting
the Practice of Religion, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 475, 492 (2008) (contemplating some form of
ministerial exception, but only where it involves core religious conduct) [hereinafter Griffin, No Law]
(link); Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004
BYU L. REV. 1099, 1195–96 (arguing that legislatures could create a statutory ministerial exception).
To the extent that the critics‘ broader arguments are consequentialist, however, they call into question
not only any future statutory ministerial exception, but the existing statutory exceptions for religious
employers. See, e.g., Griffin, No Law, supra (arguing that the leading decision upholding Title VII‘s
exemption for religious employers who discriminate on the basis of religion, Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, was wrong to the extent
that it allowed a church to select a non-ministerial employee on the basis of religion (citing 483 U.S. 327
(1987))). These kinds of consequentialist arguments will be inaccurate unless they account for nonlegal
methods of restraint as well as legal methods.
64
See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68 (1983) (link); id.
at 4 (―The rules and principles of justice, the formal institutions of the law, and the conventions of a
social order are, indeed, important to that world; they are, however, but a small part of the normative
universe that ought to claim our attention.‖).
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Religion Clauses. In addition, I believe the ministerial exception stands in
for broader constitutional and political principles: that state power is vital
but limited, that our social and constitutional infrastructure contains not just
a single monolithic authority but a number of key independent institutions,
and that pluralism, public discourse, and freedom are best served by
appreciating the extent to which these institutions are and should be selfgoverning.65
But recognizing the power that churches and other central institutions
possess is just the beginning of the conversation. Just as important as the
scope of that power is the question of what should be done with it. We
impoverish ourselves by talking only in Act II terms; by acting as if every
important question is settled once we know whether the state or the church
has the whip hand. We fail to appreciate the richness of institutional life in
a pluralistic society, and the duty of both citizens and institutions to
participate in that society after the court has spoken. Institutional autonomy
is real, but it is a burden as well as a freedom. To have a ―free Church in a
free State,‖ we need responsible churches and responsible citizens. We
must begin to think about our own parts in the drama once the curtain
comes up on Act III.

65

See HORWITZ, supra note 11 (manuscript at 16–20).
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